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NOTES
"We're Only Trying to Help": The
Burden and Standard of Proof in
Short-Term Civil Commitment*
In 1972 Justice Blackmun noted that "[c]onsidering the number
of persons affected, it is perhaps remarkable that the substantive con-
stitutional limitations on [civil commitment] have not been more fre-
quently litigated."'1 Justice Blackmun may thereby have meant to
imply that the procedural constitutional limitations on the state's
power to commit a person to a mental hospital have received abun-
dant legal attention. With respect to long-term or indefinite commit-
ment, this view is accurate. Although a number of serious questions
about substantive commitment standards remain unresolved,' most
of the procedural safeguards necessary to protect persons facing long-
term commitment have been settled by courts3 and legislatures.4
* The author thanks George J. Alexander, Dean, University of Santa Clara School of
Law, and Charles Halpern, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, for their willing-
ness to read earlier drafts of this note and for their helpful comments. Neither is responsible
for the final outcome of this note, however.
1. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 737 (1972) (citations omitted) (indefinite commit-
ment of person incompetent to stand trial violates due process and equal protection). Since
Justice Blackmun's observation, the Supreme Court has decided only one case involving civil
commitment. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (mere finding of "mental illness"
does not permit a state to confine a nondangerous individual capable of surviving outside
hospital). The Court will decide two other cases this term. J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112
(M.D. Ga. 1976), prob.juris. noted, 431 U.S. 936 (1977) (No. 75-1690) (standards for civil com-
mitment of children); State v. Addington, 557 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. 1977), prob. "iai. noted, 435
U.S. 967 (1978) (No. 77-5992) (standard of proof required of state in long-term civil commit-
ment hearings).
2. See, e.g., Comment, Advances in Mental Health: A Casefor the Right to Reuse Treatment, 48
TFMP. L.Q. 354 (1975) (right to treatment and right to refuse treatment). See generally Develop-
ments in the Law-Ci-vil Commitment oflthe Mentaly Ill, 87 HARv. L. RE V. 1190 (1974) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Developments-Civil Commitment].
3. Commitment proceedings, whether denominated "criminal" or "civil," are subject to
both the equal protection and due process clauses. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1966)
(sex offender commitment requires judicial hearing with right of counsel, confrontation, and
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Nevertheless, such procedural protection has not been provided
persons facing short-term civil commitment. Short-term commit-
ments, ranging from 2 weeks to 2 months in duration,5 are a rela-
tively new form of involuntary hospitalization.6 Statutes authorizing
such commitments may ensure some procedural protection, includ-
ing some form of judicial review.7 Nevertheless, short-term commit-
ment laws typically lack important elements of procedural due
process, perhaps most notably a clear assignment of the burden of
proof and a clear designation of the standard of proof.8 Therefore,
although in order to commit people for a long term the state must
bear the burden of proof' and generally meet the exacting standards
of either proof beyond a reasonable doubt or clear and convincing
cross-examination of witnesses, and opportunity to be heard and present evidence). The
courts have consistently extended specific procedural safeguards to different modes of com-
mitment. See, e.g., Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968) (right to counsel in
juvenile commitment proceedings); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972)
(long-term commitment requires notice, right to counsel, probable cause hearing, and then
full judicial hearing with privilege against self-incrimination, right to jury trial, exclusion of
hearsay, and proof beyond reasonable doubt), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S.
473 (1974), on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
421 U.S. 957 (1975) reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (1976).
4. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-536 to -540 (1974) (notice, counsel, hearing
with standard of proof of clear and convincing evidence); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5350
(West Supp. 1978) (notice, counsel, hearing, and jury trial); TEx. REV. Ctv. STAT. ANN. art.
5547-40 to -57 (Vernon 1958 & Supp. 1978) (notice, counsel, jury trial, and right to appeal).
5. Compare CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5250 (West 1972) (14 days) with N.Y. MENTAL
HYG. LAW § 9.33(a) (McKinney 1978) (60 days). The Mental Health Law Project's model
civil commitment statute follows the California rule of 14 days. Legal Issues in State Mental
Health Care." Proposals for Change-Civil Commitment, Suggested Statute on Civil Commitment, 2
MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 73, 127 (1977) [hereinafter cited as MHLPProposa4.
For the purposes of this note, "short-term" commitment means nonemergency commit-
ments that automatically terminate at some point no later than 2 months after they begin,
but which may then be extended into longer-term commitment by judicial process. Such
commitments must be distinguished from such brief emergency procedures as California's 72-
hour "hold." See notes 22-23 infa and accompanying text.
6. A 1973 survey showed that although the states authorized "emergency" hospitaliza-
tions of varying length, the civil commitment laws of 21 states made no provision for short-
term nonemergency commitments, and 3 states provided only for indefinite commitments. B.
ENNIS & L. SIEGEL, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS 93-282 app. A (1973).
7. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5250-5253, 5275, 5276 (West 1972 & Supp.
1978) (notice, counsel, habeas corpus review); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.310 (Supp.
1978) (notice, counsel, probable cause hearing).
8. A few courts have required a prompt hearing at which the state must show probable
cause to justify short-term nonemergency detention of a person. In re Barnard, 455 F.2d 1370
(D.C. Cir. 1971); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacatedand
remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (1976).
9. E.g., Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 709, 711 (1962) (dictum); People v. Red-
mond, 16 Cal. App. 3d 931, 94 Cal. Rptr. 543 (2d Dist. 1971).
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evidence,' the state may commit a person to short-term involuntary
hospitalization with little judicial scrutiny.
California's Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act) " provides a
useful example of the problems of the burden and standard of proof
appropriate in short-term civil commitment proceedings, because it
has served as a model for civil commitment statutes in other states
12
and closely parallels the Mental Health Law Project's model com-
mitment law.'3 The LPS Act authorizes a 14-day "certification" pe-
riod in which persons may be involuntarily hospitalized, 14 and grants
such persons the right to notice, counsel, and judicial review by
habeas corpus.'-' These provisions may appear to give individuals
ample protection from erroneous commitment. But in designating
the certification hearing a habeas corpus proceeding, the legislature
may have mistakenly placed the burden of proof on the individual,
and the statute is completely silent on the question of standard of
proof. 6 As a result of these flaws in the statute, judges frequently
decide certification cases on an ad hoc basis without uniform stand-
ards of evidence. 7
10. See, e.g., In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (reasonable doubt); In re Ste-
phenson, 67 Ill. 2d 544, 367 N.E.2d 1273 (1977) (clear and convincing evidence). The
Supreme Court, however, will be deciding this term whether a preponderance of the evidence
standard meets minimal constitutional standards. State v. Addington, 557 S.W.2d 511 (Tex.
1977), prob.juri, noted, 435 U.S. 967 (1978) (No. 77-5992).
11. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5000 to 5404.1 (West 1972 & Supp. 1978).
12. See Developments-Civil Commitment, supra note 2, at 1205-06 (noting statutes in Mas-
sachusetts, North Carolina, and Washington).
13. See AHLPProposal, supra note 5, at 131-59. The availability of empirical studies on
the effect of the LPS Act also make it a useful basis for analysis. See ENKI RESEARCH INSTI-
TUTE, A STUDY OF CALIFORNIA'S NEW MENTAL HEALTH LAW (1972); Warren, Involunta9,
Commitment for Mental Disorder: The Application of Calfomia's Lantenman-Petris-Short Act, 11 LAW
& Soc'Y REv. 629 (1977). For other studies of the Act, see Tieger & Kresser, Civil Commitment
in Calfornia.~ A Defense Perspective on the Operation of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, 28 HASTINGS
L.J. 1407 (1977); Comment, Civil Commitment of the Mental, Il in California: The Lanterman-
Petris-Short Act, 7 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 93 (1974); Comment, Civil Commitment ofthe Mental.y Ill in
California: 1969 Style, 10 SANTA CLARA LAW. 74 (1969).
14. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5250 (West 1972).
15. Id. § 5252.1.
16. See note 93 infa and accompanying text.
17. Judges often do not even state the basis of their decisions. At a certification hearing
in 1977, for example, the petition for release was denied. The certified individual asked the
judge why his writ was denied, and the judge replied, "[The public defender representing the
person] will go into it more completely with you." First Hearing of August 26, 1977, Santa
Clara County Superior Court, Rhodes, J., presiding. In another hearing held the same day,
the judge simply stated that the evidence was "clear" that the individual was gravely dis-
abled. Second Hearing of August 26, 1977, Santa Clara County Superior Court, Rhodes, J.,
presiding.
One observer found that judges frequently based their rulings on grounds not included
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Because short-term commitments are significant deprivations of
liberty, they fall within the coverage of due process. This note, focus-
ing on California's 14-day certification as the basis for analysis, ex-
amines whether due process requires any particular assignment of the
burden of proof and designation of the standard of proof in short-
term commitments. Part I outlines the structure of civil commitment
under the LPS Act and describes the role of 14-day certifications.
Part II argues that despite the labeling of the certification hearing as
a habeas corpus proceeding, a balance of the individual and state
interests at issue in certifications requires that the burden of proof be
placed on the state. Part III considers the range of standards of proof
that could be applied to the state's burden, and proposes that the
standard of clear and convincing evidence best protects both individ-
ual and state interests, while giving judges the flexibility they need in
difficult certification cases. The note concludes that California and
other states should amend their civil commitment statutes to incor-
porate these procedural protections. 8
I. THE BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM: SHORT-TERM
COMMITMENTS UNDER THE LPS ACT
The California Legislature passed the LPS Act in 1967 in re-
sponse to increasing criticism of the state's civil commitment sys-
tem. 9 That system had provided only two forms of commitment: a
72-hour "hold" for emergencies and an indefinite commitment.
20
in the statute. Warren, supra note 13, at 633-39. Another observer found that judges based
their decisions on their own subjective feelings about individuals rather than on legal stand-
ards. M. Fiala, An Examination of the Expert's Role in Civil Commitment Hearings 56-57
(1976) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Stanford Law Review).
18. A legislative solution is preferable, since litigation of short-term commitment issues
is very difficult: The gap in time between denial of release at a certification hearing and the
perfection of an appeal will cause most appellate courts to dimiss a claim as moot. Interview
with Larry Smith, California State Public Defender's Office, in Sacramento (June 21, 1977);
Interview with Steve Stevens, Santa Clara County Public Defender's Office, in San Jose (July
18, 1977).
19. Before the passage of the LPS Act, over a thousand people a month were committed
to the state's hospitals, and commitment hearings were perfunctory affairs that often took less
than 5 minutes to complete. For a discussion of the problems in the California civil commit-
ment system prior to the LPS Act, see SUBCOMM. ON MENTAL HEALTH SERvIcES OF THE
ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, THE DILEMMA OF MENTAL COMMIT-
MENTS IN CALIFORNIA: A BACKGROUND DOCUMENT 6-83 (1967) [hereinafter cited as DI-
LEMMA OF MENTAL COMMITMENTS]; Note, The Need for Reform in the California Civil
Commitment Procedure, 19 STAN. L. REv. 992 (1967).
20. See ENKI RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 13, at 130; Note, sura note 19, at
992-95. People also could be indefinitely committed as a result of detention orders growing
out of "mental illness petitions" or transfers from jails to hospitals. DILEMMA OF MENTAL
COMMITMENTS, supra note 19, at 21-27.
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The primary concern of the drafters of the LPS Act was the frequent
abuse of patients' rights caused by the absence of any nonemergency
alternatives to indefinite commitment.
2'
The LPS Act created a 3-tier structure: (1) an emergency 72-hour
hold for treatment and evaluation; 22 (2) a 14-day certification for
"intensive treatment"; 23 (3) a long-term commitment, in the form of
either a 90-day post-certification for dangerous patients24 or a 1-year
conservatorship for "gravely disabled" patients.25
A. The Role of 14-Day Certifiations
If a person placed on a 72-hour hold appears in need of further
treatment, the certification process enables the state to provide that
treatment without subjecting the person to long-term commitment.26
Although the state can only begin a post-certification or conservator-
ship commitment under a court order and after the patient has been
given the opportunity for a full jury trial,27 a 14-day certification is
not reviewed by a court unless the individual requests a habeas
corpus hearing after confinement under the certification has begun.28
The certification process therefore makes it legally possible for the
state to hospitalize persons for up to 20 days without judicial scru-
tiny." Moreover, the absence of automatic judicial review allows the
state to use a series of 14-day certifications and releases to achieve de
21. E. BARDACH, THE SKILL FACTOR IN POLITICS 145-48 (1972). The Act was largely
a product of the efforts of the three men whose names appear in the title: Frank Lanterman,
Nicholas Petris, and Alan Short. Id.
22. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West Supp. 1978).
23. Id. § 5250 (West 1972). If an individual is still dangerous to himself at the end of
the certification period, he may be recertified for an additional 14 days. Id. § 5260. Individu-
als who are still gravely disabled at the end of the certification period may be placed on a 30-
day "temporary conservatorship" for further observation. Id. §§ 5352, 5352.1, 5353 (West
Supp. 1978).
24. Id. § 5300 (West 1972).
25. Id. §§ 5350, 5361 (West Supp. 1978).
26. The legislature that passed the LPS Act felt, and prevailing medical opinion indi-
cated, that the majority of people committed require no more than 2 weeks of hospitalization
to recover sufficiently to leave the hospital. DILEMMA OF MENTAL COMMITMENTS, supra
note 19, at 139-42. A study of the effect of LPS found that the prognosis for patients at
discharge under the LPS Act's mandatory release program was as good as the prognosis for
patients who were discharged before the Act, when physicians had an unlimited time to treat
patients and release was determined solely on a medical basis. ENKI RESEARCH INSTrrUTE,
supra note 13, at 143.
27. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5302, 5350(d) (West 1972 & Supp. 1978).
28. Id. § 5252.1 (West 1972).
29. The 72-hour period does not include weekends or holidays, id. § 5253 (West Supp.
1978), so a person hospitalized on a 72-hour hold on the Wednesday before a 3-day weekend
can be held for 6 days before being placed on a 14-day certification.
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facto long-term commitment without court review. 30 The hospital
staff may also use even a single 14-day certification to establish a
psychiatric record to support a petition for imposing post-certifica-
tion commitment or conservatorship on the patient.
B. Standards for 14-Day Certifications
1. Substantive standards.
The hospital staff may certify a patient on grounds that the pa-
tient is "dangerous" or "gravely disabled" as a result of a "mental
disorder."'3 1 "Dangerousness" includes danger to self or others: Per-
sons are dangerous to themselves if they have attempted suicide prior
to or during the 72-hour hold and if they present an "imminent
threat" of making another attempt.3 Persons are dangerous to
others if they "threatened, attempted, or inflicted physical harm" on
another person before or during the 72-hour period and present an
"imminent threat of substantial physical harm" to others.33
The majority of certifications fall under the "gravely disabled"
standard.34 A person is "gravely disabled" if unable to provide the
basic needs of food, clothing, and shelter.3 5 A legislative report indi-
cates that the standard was intended to include only those persons
"incapable of carrying on transactions necessary to survival, ' 36 but
30. Evidence of this "revolving door" phenomenon appears in unpublished statistics
from the Santa Clara County Public Defender's Office (on file with Stanford Law Review).
31. "Mental disorder" is defined as any mental disorder described in the American Psy-
chiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual II. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 9, § 813
(1977); see COMM. ON NOMENCLATURE & STATISTICS OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
ASS'N, DSM-II, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (1968).
This definition is quite elastic, since DSM-IZ includes mental disorders ranging from mild
character disorders to severe psychoses. DSM-II even has a category for "social maladjust-
ments without manifest psychiatric disorder" which is defined as a category "for recording
the conditions of individuals who are pchiatrical'y normal but who nevertheless have severe
enough problems to warrant examination by a psychiatrist." Id., quoted in F. MILLER, R.
DAWSON, G. Dix & R. PARNAS, THE MENTAL HEALTH PROCESS 42 (2d ed. 1976) (emphasis
added). Presumably, this "disorder" would be sufficient to provide the "mental disorder"
necessary for certification. One study of certifications found that the mental disorders attrib-
uted to individuals at certification hearings did vary from paranoid schizophrenia to
anhedonia (inability to enjoy life). Warren, supra note 13, at 632.
32. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5260(a) (West 1972).
33. Id. § 5300.
34. Tieger & Kresser, supra note 13, at 1417; Warren, sura note 13, at 645.
35. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5008(h) (West Supp. 1978).
36. DILEMMA OF MENTAL COMMITMENTS, supra note 19, at 133 (emphasis omitted). A
recent challenge to the standard was rejected by the California Court of Appeal. Conserva-
torship of Chambers, 71 Cal. App. 3d 277, 139 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Ist Dist. 1977). The court
noted that, "The term 'gravely disabled' is sufficiently precise to exclude unusual or noncon-
formist lifestyles. It connotes an inability or refusal on the part of [the individual] to care for
basic personal needs of food, clothing and shelter." Id. at 284, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 362. Signifi-
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this standard is not strictly applied.
3 7
2. Procedures.
At the end of the 72-hour hold, the professional staff38 of the hos-
pital may certify a person for an additional 14 days of hospitalization
if it determines that the person suffers from a mental disorder result-
ing in dangerousness or grave disability.39 The staff must tell the
person he has been certified and inform him of his right to counsel,
including court-appointed counsel for indigents, and to judicial re-
view by habeas corpus.' The hospital must notify the superior court
if the individual requests a hearing,4' and an evidentiary hearing
must be held within 2 court days of the request.42 The court must
order the individual released from the hospital if it finds that the
individual is not mentally ill, dangerous, or gravely disabled.
4 3
The statute provides several important safeguards against errone-
cantly, the court used the phrase "food, clothing and shelter" rather than the statutory lan-
guage of "food, clothing, or shelter."
37. One study has found that courts are "generally supportive of the hospital's conten-
tion that the patient 'needs treatment' " regardless of whether the individual actually falls
within the statutory criteria. ENKI RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 13, at 184. Another
study found that the application of the "gravely disabled" standard has little relation to the
statutory definition. Prior hospitalizations, refusal to take medication, denial of illness, lack
of cooperation in the hospital, and rejection by the family were all used as evidence of grave
disability, although none of these factors indicates an inability to provide for food, clothing,
or shelter as required by the statute. Warren, supra note 13, at 633-38.
A judge approved the certification of a legal secretary in her mid-twenties on the basis of
testimony that she had been "conned" out of some money; the judge determined that the
woman had "poor judgment" about money and was therefore unable to provide for herself,
even though she was employed, kept her own apartment, was neatly dressed, and was not
suffering from malnutrition. Hearing of July 19, 1977, Santa Clara County Superior Court,
Longinotti, J., presiding.
38. "Professional staff" is not defined, but obviously includes psychiatrists, physicians,
and psychologists, and may include nurses and psychiatric social workers. Nevertheless, the
statute expresses a preference for certification by a psychiatrist. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 5251 (West 1972).
39. Id. § 5?50.
40. Id. § 5252. 1. The staff must also explain the meaning of review by habeas corpus to
the certified individual. Id.
41. The person may request a hearing immediately upon certification or at any time
during the certification period. Intentional failure to notify the superior court of the county
in which the person is certified is a misdemeanor. Id. § 5275. A request for release is suffi-
cient to require a hearing. Id. The individual has a right to a public hearing, and in many
counties the hearings are regularly held at the superior courthouse. The hearings are rou-
tinely transcribed by a court reporter. A constitutional argument that the hearing should be
mandatory was rejected in Thorn v. Superior Court, I Cal. 3d 666,464 P.2d 56,83 Cal. Rptr.
600 (1970).
42. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5276 (West 1972).
43. Id. Furthermore, if the hospital has failed to inform the person of his rights, notify
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ous certification for individuals, including notice, counsel, and a
hearing. But it also omits two essential safeguards: The statute ap-
pears to place the burden of proof on the individual to demonstrate
that the certification is unwarranted, and it is completely silent on
the standard of proof required to meet the burden. The next part
discusses whether the state may constitutionally require the individ-
ual to bear the burden of proof in 14-day certification hearings.
II. THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN SHORT-TERM COMMITMENTS
The assignment of the burden of proof" can determine the result
of a certification hearing. If the state bears the burden, it will have to
show that the individual is mentally ill and dangerous or gravely dis-
abled through the testimony of the certifying psychiatrist or other
hospital personnel. If the individual bears the burden, on the other
hand, he will have the difficult task of disproving the state's allega-
tions, and, as a practical matter, will probably have to do so without
independent experts or other favorable witnesses.45
A. The Efect of the Provision for Habeas Corpus Relief
The LPS Act's silence on the question of burden of proof may
have its source in the political background of the statute. Fourteen-
day certifications developed as a compromise between civil liberta-
rian interests arguing that no one should be hospitalized beyond the
72-hour emergency period without a mandatory court hearing, and
medical interests arguing for minimum legal interference in the treat-
ment of mental disorders. 6 The legislature recognized the civil liber-
tarian interests by providing for notice, right to counsel, and habeas
review upon request, and recognized the medical interests by al-
lowing for legal commitment for up to 20 days without mandatory
him of the certification, or is an unaccredited hospital, the judge must order the person re-
leased. Id.
44. "Burden of proof" actually has two separate meanings. The party with the burden
of proof may bear the burden of going forward with the production of evidence or the burden
of persuading the factfinder. For the purposes of this note, "burden of proof" includes both
these elements. See McNaughton, Burden of Production of Evidence: A Function of a Burden of
Persuasion, 68 HARV. L. REv. 1382 (1955).
45. The statute does not provide for independent experts, and the expense and difficulty
of retaining a psychiatrist to testify in his behalf may be prohibitive for the individual. More-
over, an impartial observer is not likely to be present at the time the person is notified of the
certification to observe if the staff properly follows certification procedure. Petitioners are
therefore likely to be at a great disadvantage at their hearings, relying chiefly on their own
testimony and demeanor. Tieger & Kresser, supra note 13, at 1417; see note 90 infia and
accompanying text.
46. ENKI RESEARCH INSTITUTE, sufira note 13, at 15.
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court review.4v The compromise was apparently so delicate that fur-
ther pressure from either side might have caused the collapse of the
entire LPS Act.48 The legislature's silence on the burden of proof
may therefore have been a deliberate attempt to avoid a troublesome
issue.
The LPS Act's failure to assign the burden of proof in certifica-
tion hearings, whether deliberate or inadvertent, would seem to in-
vite the courts to make that assignment themselves upon basic due
process principles.49 But one argument stands in the way of the due
process approach: The legislature made the certification hearing a
habeas corpus proceeding, and the history of the writ finds the bur-
den of proof traditionally placed on the petitioner.50
One plausible explanation for the legislature's decision to provide
for review by habeas, a reason rooted in an ancient use of the writ,
51
is to ensure that certified patients will be allowed to come to court to
attend their hearings.52 But that basis for the writ is irrelevant to the
traditional view that habeas places the burden on the petitioner.
The assignment of burden of proof in habeas proceedings stems from
the most frequent modern use of the writ-to allow review of court-
imposed custody. When used for this purpose, the habeas proceeding
demands placing the burden on the petitioner, to ensure the pre-
sumption that the original court-approved confinement was proper.
53
That concept of habeas, however, is obviously inapplicable to certifi-
cation hearings, since the patient's original confinement through the
47. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
48. A legislative aide working for one of the sponsors stated, "The ship we are trying to
float can sink very easily with too much weight on one side or another." E. BARDACH, supra
note 21, at 118.
49. Two authors of the Act stated that the Act was intended to provide "full due process
protection" for individuals. F. LANTERMAN & N. PETRIS, THE MENTAL HEALTH ACT OF
1967, ASSEMBLY BILL 1220, at 12 (1967).
50. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468-69 (1938).
51. See Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1042
(1970) (habeas emerged in England as procedure to ensure court attendance of both parties to
an action) [hereinafter cited as Developments-Habeas].
52. Prior to the LPS Act, a court could authorize the sheriff to take a person into cus-
tody and detain him for an indefinite period as a result of an ex parte proceeding. Project,
Civil Commitment of the Mentaly III, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 822, 845-51 (1967). During the
negotiations leading to the Act, medical interests argued that it would be unduly "traumatic"
to patients if they attended the hearings. See, e.g., ENKI RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note
13, at 15. Even without the specific provision of the LPS Act, a patient would have the
common law right to petition through habeas corpus to challenge the legality of his or her
confinement. See, e.g., In re Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d 126, 496 P.2d 465, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1972).
53. See Developments-Habeas, supra note 51, at 1044-45 (statutory habeas corpus devel-
oped as a means to challenge executive detention).
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72-hour hold and certification by the hospital staff will never have
been tested by a court.54 The argument that the individual must
bear the burden of proof in a certification hearing because the hear-
ing is a habeas proceeding is therefore a weak one 55 and conventional
due process analysis must be invoked to fill the legislative gap.
Due process analysis begins with a measure of the individual and
state interests at odds in a given proceeding. When the individual
interests at stake fall within the "life, liberty or property" language of
the 14th amendment, the courts must balance the individual inter-
ests against those of the state to determine what procedures due proc-
ess requires.56 When the individual interest at stake in a burden of
proof issue is personal liberty, the courts have regarded the potential
loss of that liberty as "grievous, '57 and have generally determined
that the balance tips in favor of placing the burden on the state.5,8
Thus, any interest-balancing in a new context involving personal lib-
erty begins with a heavy presumption in favor of placing the burden
on the state. The next two sections identify the individual and state
interests to determine whether the state can overcome that presump-
tion in short-term commitment proceedings.
54. In this sense, the certification is identical to an initial commitment hearing, at which
the patient has the right to a full jury trial, see note 27 supra and accompanying text, and for
which habeas would therefore be an inadequate remedy. See, e.g., Baxstrom v. Herold, 383
U.S. 107 (1966) (holding convicted criminal in mental hospital beyond original criminal sen-
tence without new jury trial violates equal protection, because civil commitment requires jury
trial; habeas inadequate by implication); United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d
1071 (2d Cir. 1969) (habeas provision placing burden of proof on petitioner inadequate to
protect convict being transferred to mental hospital, since burden normally on state in com-
mitment hearings). A habeas procedure is nevertheless adequate, and the burden properly
placed on the individual, when a patient seeks release from a legally established long-term
commitment. See Overholser v. O'Beirne, 302 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1962); In re Franklin, 7
Cal. 3d 126, 496 P.2d 465, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1972).
55. Cf Matthews v. Hardy, 420 F.2d 607, 612 n. 14 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (habeas proceeding
to review initial commitment of convicted criminals or dangerous patients to maximum-
security mental hospital violates equal protection); Dixon v. Attorney General, 325 F. Supp.
966 (M.D. Pa. 1971) (same on both equal protection and due process grounds).
56. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972); see Note, "Liberty," '"roperty,"
and Procedural Due Process, 56 OR. L. REV. 137, 140 (1977).
57. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).
58. See, e.g., id. at 488 (parole revocation proceeding); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364,
368 (1970) (criminal and juvenile delinquency proceedings); Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S.
705, 709, 711 (1962) (civil commitment proceedings) (dictum); People v. Redmond, 16 Cal.
App. 3d 931, 94 Cal. Rptr. 543 (2d Dist. 1971) (civil commitment); cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103 (1975) (probable cause hearing after arrest).
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B. The Individual Interests at Stake in Certiftcation Hearings
1. Liberty.
Even a short-term civil commitment impinges on an individual's
most elemental physical liberty.59 Certified patients cannot leave the
hospital without official permission, and may even find themselves in
locked wards.' The constraint on liberty may continue even after
the certification period ends, since the patient may be required to
report to the hospital periodically or continue taking medication,
61
and a failure to do either may result in additional confinement.62
Moreover, individuals released after certification often fall under
close surveillance by the police.
63
2. Stzgma.
Although stigma has not been identified as a separate due process
interest,' it assumes constitutional importance when combined with
loss of physical liberty. Civil commitment imposes demonstrable so-
cial stigma on patients; 65 people labeled as mentally ill suffer more
59. "Although 7 days may not appear to some to be a very long time, experience has
indicated that any kind of forcible detention of a person in an alien environment may seri-
ously affect him. . . ." Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights, 91st Cong.,
Ist & 2d Sess. 210 (1969-1970) (statement of Arthur Cohen, ACLU attorney); see E.
GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS 146-49 (1961) (initial days of hospitalization are often most difficult for
patient); Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and Consti-
tutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1108, 1130 (1972) (many patients adjust to hospital by
means of withdrawal and other defenses; hospitalization itself can cause long-lasting mental
illness).
60. See Brief for Appellant at 15-18, Addington v. Texas, 435 U.S. 967 (1978) (No. 77-
5992) (noting probable jurisdiction). The locked ward serves not only to control the violent
patient, but also to coerce even the nonviolent patient to behave in a way deemed appropri-
ate by the hospital staff. E. GOFFMAN, supra note 59, at 85-86; Ferleger, Loosening the Chains:
In-Hospital Civil Liberties of Mental Patients, 13 SANTA CLARA LAw. 447 (1973). For a patient's
own account of the use of the locked ward to control behavior, see K. DONALDSON, INSANITY
INSIDE OUT (1976).
61. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 136-38
(rev. ed. S. Brakel & R. Rock eds. 1971).
62. Warren, supra note 13, at 634-35.
63. See Steadman & Keveles, The Community Adjustment and Criminal Activities of the Bax-
strom Patients 1966-1970, 129 AM. J. PSYCH. 304, 309 (1972) (innocent behavior such as
sleeping on park benches, ignored in other cases, resulted in arrests of ex-mental patients
previously committed as dangerous to others).
64. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (reputation not liberty or property interest). But
see Note, Reputation, Stigma and Section 1983: The Lessons of Paul v. Davis, 30 STAN. L. REv. 191
(1977).
65. F. MILLER, R. DAWSON, G. DIX & R. PARNAS, supra note 31, at 240; Sarbin &
Mancuso, Failure of a Moral Enterprise: Attitudes of the Public Toward Mental Illness, 35 J. CON-
SULTING & CLINICAL PSYCH. 159 (1970). Professor Rosenhan's well-known study demon-
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employment discrimination and general social rejection than re-
leased convicted criminals.66 The extent of stigma resulting from 14-
day certifications in particular has not been fully studied,67 but be-
cause stigma attaches even to voluntary patients consulting private
therapists, the certified patient is not likely to escape it.61
3. Unwanted treatment.
Although the state rarely requires physically ill people to seek
medical attention or accept a given treatment,69 it frequently denies
a similar freedom of choice to individuals suffering from mental dis-
orders.7° California law does give individuals an absolute right to
strates that diagnostic labels become self-fulfilling prophecies for later interpretations of
behavior, even if that behavior is perfectly "normal." Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane
Places, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 379, 396 (1973). Stereotypes of how mentally ill persons be-
have determine society's perception of, and interaction with, a person labeled as mentally ill.
T. SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL 64-80 (1966). Moreover, the individual may engage in a
kind of self-labeling process, thereby losing the self-esteem necessary to mental health or
learning to behave as mentally ill people are "supposed to" behave. Id. at 84-86. The
"learned helplessness" resulting from self-labeling may itself cause mental illness, especially
depression. M. SELIGMAN, HELPLESSNESS (1975).
66. See Harasymiw, A Longitudizal Study of Disability Group Acceptance, 37 REHABILITA-
TION LITERATURE 98 (1976); Tringo, The Hierarchy of Preference Toward Disability Groups, 4 J.
SPECIAL EDUC. 295 (1970). "Knowledge of previous psychiatric treatment and/or the posses-
sion of a psychiatric label is . . . used prejudiciously to exclude individuals, as if society's
institutions were attempting to protect themselves against what is felt to be a threat." Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association, Position Statement on Discrimination Against Persons with Previous Psy-
chiatric Treatment, 135 AM. J. PSYCH. 643, 643 (1978).
67. A study done after the LPS Act had been in effect for 2 years found that individuals
did not perceive employment discrimination as a result of their certifications, but the study
did not determine whether the fact of certification actually arose between the subjects and
their employers. ENKI RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 13, at 149.
68. Bord, Rejection of the Mentaly Ill- Continuities and Further Developments, 18 Soc. PROB.
496 (1971). People might assume that a person absent from home or work for 17-20 days
may simply be on vacation or physically ill, or may at least be more tolerant of someone with
a short-term "problem" than one who has been so "sick" as to require long-term hospitaliza-
tion. Id. But the cause of such an absence is likely to become known, and the individual will
be identified not only as mentally ill, but also as "dangerous" or "gravely disabled." See, e.g.,
Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62
CALIF. L. REV. 693, 716 (1974).
69. Physically ill people generally are protected from involuntary treatment by common
law tort doctrine, absent an emergency. McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized
Medical Treatment, 41 MINN. L. REv. 381 (1957).
70. Involuntarily committed patients usually cannot refuse prescribed treatment, Devel-
opments-Civil Commitment, supra note 2, at 1194 & n.2, on the presumption that their illness
prevents them from making rational choices to consent, Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On
theJustifwcations for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 75, 88 (1968). Nevertheless, many
mental disorders affect only a small portion of an individual's thinking and behavior, and
leave him capable of making rational choices about treatment. A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH
LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 47 (1976). Chief Justice Burger urged consideration of a
right to refuse treatment in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 580-83 (1975) (Burger,
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refuse the most drastic forms of treatment-psychosurgery and elec-
troconvulsive therapy7"1 -but it does not give mental patients a right
to refuse medication or other forms of treatment. Certified patients
refusing medication may receive it by force or other forms of
coercion.72
C. The State Interests Served by Certification
1. Police power. the dangerousness standard.
State confinement of individuals who are mentally ill and dan-
gerous to the safety of society or themselves has long been a legiti-
mate function of the state's police power to protect the public health,
welfare, and safety.73
Although few mentally ill people are dangerous,74 many of the
most notorious murderers in recent memory were mentally ill at the
time of their crimes.75 The purpose of the police power is to isolate
such people before they wreak havoc on society. And though few
mentally ill persons are suicidal, failure to intervene when a mentally
CJ., concurring), and lower courts have fashioned such a right on a number of grounds. E.g.,
Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976) (first amendment protection of individual's
thoughts); Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973) (eighth amendment prohibition
of cruel and unusual punishment); Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 985 (1971) (freedom of religion); Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085
(E.D. Mich. 1974) (right to privacy); see Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patient's
Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. L. REv. 461, 490-97 (1977).
71. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5325(f) to (g) (West Supp. 1978).
72. See, e.g., D. CHANDLER & A. SALLYCHILD, THE USE AND MISUSE OF PSYCHIATRIC
DRUGS IN CALIFORNIA'S MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAMS 37-38, 71-75 & Tables 23-28 (1977).
Psychoactive medications can have unpleasant and sometimes harmful effects on patients.
These effects range from dizziness, drowsiness, slurred speech, dryness of the mouth, and mus-
cle spasms to heart failure and tardive dyskinesia, a frequently irreversible condition in which
the person loses control of facial and limb movements. Id. at 15-18. See also Editorial- Neurolog-
ical Syndromes Associated with Anttsychotic Drug Use, A Special Report, 28 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCH.
463 (1973).
73. Some argue that the police power is the ony justification for civil commitment, e.g.,
A. STONE, supra note 70, at 25-26, but a parens patriae power has been invoked to justify
commitment of at least those dangerous to self, see, e.g., In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 658 (D.C.
Cir. 1973). But see Developments-Civil Commitment, supra note 2, at 1225 (prevention of suicide
part of police power, since suicide may affect family and others).
74. D. LUNDE, MURDER AND MADNESS 35 (1975) (negative correlation between mur-
der and mental illness); Steadman & Keveles, supra note 63, at 307 (fewer than 3% of persons
committed as criminally dangerous and ordered released later confined for dangerous
behavior).
75. For example, the crimes of Herbert Mullin, "a classic example of a mentally ill mass
murderer," and John Linley Frazier, another mentally ill mass murderer, might have been
prevented had efforts to hospitalize them not failed. D. LUNDE, supra note 74, at 63-64,
49-52.
STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:425
ill person is suicidal is often disastrous.76
2. Parens patriae. the gravely disabled standard.
Parens patriae, literally "parent of the country,"" originally de-
veloped as a justification for a king to take control of persons and
property in order to prevent dissipation of valuable estates by incom-
petent tenants.78 Parens patriae later developed in America as a jus-
tification for state-sanctioned civil commitments, 79 and today serves
as the rationale for realizing the state's humanitarian interests in car-
ing for those who cannot care for themselves.
The Supreme Court recently limited the reach of the parens pa-
triae power in O'Connor v. Donaldson.8 ° The Court held that a state
cannot constitutionally confine "without more" nondangerous per-
sons capable of surviving safely by themselves or with the help of
others;81 it emphasized in dictum that committing a person simply
because he is mentally ill or because the state wishes to assure the
person a better standard of living is unconstitutional.
82
D. Reconciling the Interests
Threatened with a loss of liberty for up to 20 days, social stigma,
and forced treatment, individuals have considerable reason to insist
that the state bear the burden of proving the need for certification.
76. Prompt intervention may prevent successful suicides or future suicide attempts. See
Note, Civil Commitment in California, 1969 Style, supra note 13, at 93.
77. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1269 (4th ed. 1968).
78. By the time of the American Revolution, the king of England had absolute author-
ity to act as guardian of all "idiots, infants and lunatics" to protect their personal welfare and
their property. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972) (quoting 3 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES *47).
79. D. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM (1971).
80. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
81. Id. at 575-76. The Court did not directly address the issue of whether a
nondangerous person receiving treatment could be confined indefinitely. Id. at 573. Chief Jus-
tice Burger criticized the majority for avoiding the issue, arguing that the question of the
reach of the parens patriae power was independent of what, if any, treatment is provided, and
that parens patriae commitments can only be justified in cases where a person is unable to
function in society and would suffer real harm if not placed in a sheltered environment. Id. at
583-84 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
Under either view in Donaldson, the LPS Act's substantive provision for 14-day certifica-
tion of gravely disabled individuals is constitutional. The grave disability provisions are di-
rected to nondangerous persons incapable of providing for the basic necessities of life, and the
Act specifies that certifications for all patients are for "intensive treatment." CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 5250 (West 1972); see notes 34-37 supra and accompanying text.
82. 422 U.S. at 576. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, commented that "the
mere presence of mental illness does not disqualify a person from preferring his home to the
comforts of an institution." Id. at 575.
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Although the state has strong interests in protecting society and car-
ing for those who cannot care for themselves, these interests do not
seem sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption in favor
of protecting the individual's liberty.83 Nevertheless, even if general
interest balancing favors a proposed procedural safeguard, the courts
will not require the safeguard until other factors are examined. Due
process analysis also considers the strength of the state's interests, the
weight of the administrative burden imposed by a given safeguard,
and the protection the safeguard affords to the individual.84 A closer
examination of the certification process reveals that placing the bur-
den on the state is appropriate even in light of these considerations.
The state engages in a form of preventive detention when it seeks
to certify persons under the dangerousness standard.85 Because the
mentally ill are the only group of potentially dangerous persons sub-
ject to preventive detention, the state should exercise this power cau-
tiously. This is especially important because the mentally ill are not
dangerous per se,86 and dangerousness is difficult to predict.87 Thus,
83. See notes 73-82 supra and accompanying text.
84. "The Court has repeatedly emphasized that determination of the constitutionally
required procedural safeguards in any situation requires recognition both of the 'interests
affected' and of the 'circumstances involved' . . . ." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 69 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). These circumstances include the
strength of the state's interests, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,483 (1972), and the practi-
cal effect of requiring a given safeguard, see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578 (1975).
85. Overt attempts to extend preventive detention to other groups have been sharply
criticized, see Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World ofJohn Mitchell, 56 VA.
L. REV. 371,385-90 (1970), and such detention is not generally authorized by law although it
may exist in fact, Note, Preventive Detention: An Empirical Analysis, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
300, 346-47 (1971). The mentally ill are not a suspect class for the purposes of the equal
protection clause, see Note, Mental Illness." A Suspect Classifration?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237 (1974),
but the effect of civil commitment on fundamental rights may require a compelling state
interest to justify detention. The classification does not appear to have even a rational basis,
however, for the mentally ill as a class are no more dangerous to society than other individu-
als. Developments--Civil Commitment, supra note 2, at 1229-3 1; see note 87 infra and accompany-
ing text.
86. See A. STONE, supra note 70, at 27 (at most, 10% of hospitalized mentally ill persons
are actually dangerous); note 87 infta and accompanying text.
87. Determining society's interest in protecting itself from the "dangerousness" of a
given person requires answers to three different and very difficult questions: (1) Who is likely
to cause harm? (2) What form is that harm likely to take? (3) When is the harm likely to
occur? The difficulty of these questions has meant that the civil commitment process makes
little effort to predict with any precision the likely danger of any prospective patient. See
Ennis & Litwack, supra note 68, at 711-16. The primary problem is that psychiatrists and
psychologists "over-predict" or make "false-positive" errors. Present psychological techniques
for predicting violence err in at least 60-70% of all cases: At least 6 out of 10 persons declared
dangerous will cause no actual harm. Id. at 714. Even if predicting violent behavior were
95% accurate, a large number of persons who will never perform violent acts will be commit-
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the state should not be permitted to certify individuals on the basis of
dangerousness without having to justify its action in court, for the
probability that a particular person is dangerous in fact is very low.88
Similarly, under the "gravely disabled" standard, the state is likely to
commit great numbers of people who are simply mentally ill or per-
haps nuisances to their families or others, but who are capable of
caring for their daily needs.8 9
Moreover, placing the burden of proof on the state would create
practical benefits for the individual that easily outweigh any admin-
istrative burden the state is likely to bear. The state is the party in-
voking the certification process, and has the monetary resources and
expert medical witnesses to bear the burden in screening and litigat-
ing certifications. On the other hand, a certified individual usually
has no independent experts to testify in his behalf, and comes to
court already labeled as mentally ill by virtue of having been certi-
fied.9° Furthermore, the person must overcome the judge's likely re-
luctance to contravene the judgment of the hospital psychiatrists by
ordering the person's release.9'
Both the theoretical and practical considerations in due process
ted as dangerous. Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, supra note 70, at 84-85. But see Monahan,
Prediction Research and the Emergeng Commitment ofDangerous Mentally Ill Persons. A Reconsideration,
135 AM. J. PSYCH. 198 (1978) (stating research in institutional settings cannot be generalized
to "emergency" situations).
Suicide is also difficult to predict. See Greenberg, Involunta ry Psychiatric Commitments to
Prevent Suicide, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 227, 259-63 (1974) (review of literature on prediction of
suicide). But see Comment, Civil Commitment in California: 1969 Style, supra note 13, at 94-95
(prior suicide attempts place an individual in a high-risk category and may justify
intervention).
88. See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
89. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); A. STONE, supra note 70, at 46; cf.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Experience
should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government's purposes
are beneficent. . . . The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of
zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.").
90. See ENKI RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 13, at 184; DILEMMA OF MENTAL
COMMITMENTS, supra note 19, at 40-43.
91. Judges seldom have much knowledge of mental illness and often will defer to psy-
chiatric experts. Bazelon, Institutional Pschiat--"The SelfInflicted Wouna, " 23 ATH. U.L.
REV. 643 (1974); Hiday, Reformed Commitment Procedures: An Empirical Study in the Courtroom, 11
LAW & Soc'Y REv. 651, 655 (1977); Hoffman & Foust, Least Restrictive Treatment of the Mentaly
Il: A Doctrine in Search of Its Senses, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1100, 1137 & Table X (1977).
Moreover, humanitarian motives may influence judges to approve involuntary hospitaliza-
tions when a person is in need of some type of treatment, even when hospitalization is unnec-
essary. See ENKI RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 13, at 184; Hoffman & Foust, supra, at
1136. Finally, judges may be concerned about releasing "dangerous" individuals, and, like
doctors, may prefer to err on the side of caution and approve the commitment. See Ennis &
Litwack, supra note 68, at 711, 729; Hiday, supra, at 655.
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analysis argue for an explicit assignment of the burden of proof to the
state. Presently, judges at certification hearings face the dilemma of
either placing the burden on the individual in violation of due proc-
ess, or placing it on the state in contravention of the statutory provi-
sion that the hearing is a habeas corpus proceeding. The current
uncertainty about the allocation of the burden of proof also has
blurred the adversarial nature of the hearing, leaving many attorneys
representing certified individuals confused about their appropriate
roles as counsel.92 The legislature can resolve these problems by
amending the LPS Act, making it clear that the state bears the bur-
den of proof.
III. THE STANDARD OF PROOF IN CERTIFICATION HEARINGS
Shifting the burden of proof to the state in certification hearings
helps protect the constitutional rights of persons facing 14 days of
involuntary hospitalization. But that protection is incomplete with-
out a determination of the proper weight to assign that burden-the
standard of proof. The LPS Act never mentions a standard of proof
for certification hearings. Courts would therefore appear justified in
applying the standard of a preponderance of the evidence, since the
California Evidence Code prescribes that standard in any adjudica-
tion for which no other standard is expressly provided by statute or
court decision.93
Nevertheless, it may be hasty to assume that the drafters of the
LPS Act deliberately incorporated the general preponderance rule.
Rather, as with the question of burden of proof, the drafters' silence
on the standard of proof issue may represent either inadvertence, or
deliberate avoidance as part of the delicate political compromise that
made enactment of the LPS Act possible.94 The requirements of due
process demand that the law clearly and consciously assign the stan-
dard of proof after consideration of the strong individual and state
interests affected by any particular standard.
92. Attorneys in civil commitment proceedings often do not see themselves in the tradi-
tional role of adversaries. Some ignore or discount their client's wishes and acquiesce in the
commitment, see Wexler & Scoville, The Administration ofPsychiatricJustice: Theory and Practice in
Ariona, 13 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 52-54 (1971), and those who do not still may be uncertain of
their precise role. See, e.g., Cohen, The Function of the Attorne and the Commitment of the Mentaly
1/1, 44 TEX. L. REv. 424 (1966); Monahan, Empirical Analyses of Civil Commitment: Critique &
Context, 11 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 619, 623-24 (1977); Note, The Role of Cotmselin the Civil Commit-
ment Process: A Theoretical Framework, 84 YALE L.J. 1540 (1975).
93. CAL. EVID. CODE § 115 (West 1966).
94. See notes 46-48 supra and accompanying text.
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
The courts and legislatures initially have a wide choice of stand-
ards, ranging from the least exacting standard of probable cause, to
preponderance of the evidence, to clear and convincing evidence, to
the most exacting standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
95
Although the distinctions among these standards may appear elusive
in the abstract,96 they may become critical in practice. Depending
on the circumstances of a given proceeding, a small change in the
standard of proof may tip the balance in favor of one party or the
other. As a result, courts frequently have adjusted the standard of
proof upwards in proportion to the severity of the consequences of an
erroneous decision in a particular type of proceeding.97
As in the determination of the assignment of the burden of proof,
determining the proper standard of proof requires not only a balanc-
ing of individual and state interests, but also a subtle analysis of the
practical considerations in a given type of proceeding. A starting
point in the analysis for certification hearings is an examination of
the standard of proof question in the closely related area of long-term
commitments.
A. The Standard of Proof in Long- Term Civil Commitment
Recent court examination of the standard of proof in long-term
civil commitment hearings is founded on the general constitutional
development of the standard of proof in cases involving serious depri-
vations of individual liberty. In 1970, the United States Supreme
Court held in In re Winship that due process requires proof beyond a
reasonable doubt in criminal and juvenile delinquency proceed-
ings.98 The Court first referred99 to the initial balance of individual
and state interests it had struck 3 years earlier in In re Gault.'°° Gault
had held that the requirements of procedural due process applied to
juvenile delinquency hearings because of their effect on individual
liberty. The Court in Winship extended its analysis in Gault by hold-
ing that in criminal and juvenile delinquency proceedings, the indi-
95. For a general discussion of standards of proof, see C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 339-341 (2d ed. 1972).
96. See id. § 339.
97. See, e.g., People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 535 P.2d 352, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1975)
(California Supreme Court noting that "mentally disordered sex offender" could be commit-
ted for life, but required proof beyond reasonable doubt; reversing decision applying prepon-
derance of evidence standard).
98. 397 U.S. 358, 364, 368 (1970).
99. Id. at 365-66.
100. 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (in juvenile delinquency proceedings, child's interest in liberty
warrants safeguards of notice, counsel, confrontation, privilege against self-incrimination, and
written record).
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vidual's interest in personal liberty and freedom from stigma,
combined with society's interest in preserving the freedom and good
name of the individual, outweigh the state's interests in punishment,
protection of society, and rehabilitation.' 0 ' In requiring the standard
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in such proceedings, the Court
incorporated into its analysis a consideration of society's values and
the practical results flowing from the use of a particular standard of
proof in the proceedings under review.1"2
Many courts have used Winshzb as a basis for requiring the stan-
dard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in long-term civil commit-
ment hearings. 0 3 The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
relied on Wfinshiz's extension of the standard of proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt from criminal to juvenile proceedings in In re Ballay.'04
The court, instead of analyzing the issue on general due process
grounds, compared the state and individual interests at stake in civil
commitment proceedings with those in criminal cases.' 0 5 The court
found the state interests in civil commitments were no greater than
101. 397 U.S. at 365-68.
102. See id. at 366-67 (strict standard of proof would not put undue practical burden on
state); id. at 375 (Harlan, J., concurring) (same).
103. In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp.
1113 (D. Haw. 1976); Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Lessard v.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S.
473, on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 421
U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (1976); Superintendent v. Hagberg, 78 Mass.
Adv. Sh. 187, 372 N.E.2d 242 (1978); Lausche v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 302 Minn.
65, 225 N.W.2d 366 (1974) (dictum), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 993 (1975); Proctor v. Butler, -
N.H. -, 380 A.2d 673 (1977); State v. O'Neill, 274 Or. 59, 545 P.2d 97 (1976); cf. In re Levias,
83 Wash. 2d 253, 517 P.2d 588 (1973) (clear, cogent, and convincing evidence civil analogue
to proof beyond a reasonable doubt). The Kentucky Court of Appeals held that proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt is required in civil commitment proceedings well before Winship was
decided. Denton v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 681 (Ky. 1964).
At least eight states have statutes requiring the use of the standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt for some elements in long-term civil commitment proceedings. HAw. REV.
STAT. § 334-60(b)(4)(1) (Supp. 1978) (mentally ill, dangerous to self or others or in need of
treatment, and no less restrictive alternative available); IDAHO CODE § 66-329(i) (Supp. 1978)
(mentally ill or retarded, or likely to injure self or others); KAN. STAT. § 59-2917 (1976) (men-
tally ill); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 38-1305(7) (Supp. 1977) (any physical facts or evi-
dence); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 54.1(C) (West Supp. 1977) (mentally ill and either
dangerous to self or others or unable to care for self); OR. REv. STAT. § 426.130 (1977)
(mentally ill); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-36(6) (1978) (mentally ill, no less restrictive alterna-
tive, and either immediate danger to self or others or unable to care for self); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 51.20(12) (West Supp. 1978) (mentally ill and either dangerous to self or others or unable to
care for self).
104. 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Ballay had been committed under a statute provid-
ing indefinite commitment of persons dangerous to themselves or others. Id. at 649 n.2.
105. Id. at 657-58.
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those in criminal cases,10 6 and that the individual interests in civil
commitments were if anything greater. 07 The court expressly re-
jected the argument that the ostensibly beneficial purpose of involun-
tary hospitalization argued for a standard of proof lower than that of
beyond a reasonable doubt.0 8
The California Supreme Court has reached different results on
the issue of the standard of proof depending on the grounds for
commitment. In People v. Burmck,'09 the court followed W'nship and
Ballay in holding that the stigma and indefinite loss of liberty result-
ing from commitment as a mentally disordered sex offender (m.d.s.o.)
required the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in m.d.s.o.
proceedings." 0 The court later extended this requirement to com-
mitments of narcotics addicts."'
In 1978, however, in In re Estate of Roulet," 2 the California court
declined to require the strict standard of proof in 1-year commitments
for grave disability. The majority based its rejection of the standard
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on the civil nature of the com-
mitments, the likelihood that society would view the gravely disabled
with compassion, and the definite time limitation on the commit-
ment." 3 The majority reasoned that because commitments for grave
disability were for the individual's benefit, the analogy to criminal
confinement was inappropriate.' '4 They acknowledged that the in-
dividual's interest in personal liberty would receive inadequate pro-
tection under the preponderance standard, however, and struck a
middle ground by holding that the proper standard was that of clear
and convincing evidence." 5 Other courts have reached the same
106. Id.
107. Id. at 668-69 (stressing that mental patients, unlike criminals, can be detained
indefinitely, and danger of patients after release suffering social ostracism, employment dis-
crimination, and self-labeling detrimental to their health).
108. Id. at 667 (noting that "beneficial" hospitalization can seriously harm patients).
109. 14 Cal. 3d 306, 535 P.2d 352, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1975).
110. Id. at 324-25, 535 P.2d at 364, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
11i. People v. Thomas, 19 Cal. 3d 630, 566 P.2d 228, 139 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1977).
112. 20 Cal. 3d Adv. Sh. 653, 574 P.2d 1245, 143 Cal. Rptr. 893, rehearing granted, 20
Cal. 3d 653 (1978).
113. Id. at 659-60, 574 P.2d at 1249, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 897.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 660-61, 574 P.2d at 1249, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 897-98. The majority held that
the preponderance standard would "fail to adequately safeguard the individual's rights" and
that "[t]his potential deprivation of liberty dictates a higher standard of proof be used to
minimize risk of error." The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, on the other hand, "may
. . . prevent individuals from receiving sorely needed aid. . . . [A]n individual may quite
literally be left to languish in the streets. Application of the criminal standard would threaten
the beneficial statutory purpose . . . . " Id. at 661, 574 P.2d at 1249, 143 Cal. Rptr. at
897-98.
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conclusion. "6
The Roulet dissent, written by Chief Justice Bird, insisted that the
majority was contradicting the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court in Winship and Cault which explicitly stated that the
distinction between civil and criminal proceedings is irrelevant to a
determination of due process requirements. ' 7 The dissent pointed
out that the compassion towards the gravely disabled envisioned by
the majority was at odds with the reality of the stigma experienced
by most former mental patients. 8 Winship and the California
court's holdings in Burnick and other cases mandated the use of the
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard when a finding adverse to the
individual resulted in stigma and a deprivation of liberty. The court
granted a rehearing in Roulet," 9 and a change in the court's member-
ship created majority support for Chief Justice Bird's position. 120
The United States Supreme Court will decide this term whether
the constitutional minimum in long-term civil commitment proceed-
ings is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, clear and convincing
evidence, or proof by a preponderance.1 2 ' The consensus of jurisdic-
tions is that long-term commitments require the standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt or clear and convincing evidence. This
choice of standards from the upper range of the four theoretical
choices for long-term civil commitment provides a basis for exa-
mining the appropriate standard for short-term commitment
proceedings.
B. Long- Term and Short- Term Commitments: A Comparison of the
Interests Relevant to the Selection of the Standard of Proof
With the standards of proof beyond a reasonable doubt or clear
and convincing evidence established as a yardstick for long-term
116. Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Doremus v. Farrell, 407
F. Supp. 509 (D. Neb. 1975); In re Stephenson, 67 Il. 2d 544, 367 N.E.2d 1273 (1977); In re
Valdez, 88 N.M. 338, 540 P.2d 818 (1975).
117. See notes 98-102 supra and accompanying text.
118. In re Estate of Roulet, 20 Cal. 3d Adv. Sh. 653, 669-71, 574 P.2d 1245, 1255-56,
143 Cal. Rptr. 893, 903-04 (Bird, CJ., dissenting), reheaing granted, 20 Cal. 3d 653 (1978).
119. 20 Cal. 3d 653 (1978).
120. Justice Frank Newman joined the original dissenters in holding that proof beyond
a reasonable doubt is required. In re Estate of Roulet, S. F. Chronicle, Feb. 7, 1979, at 6, col.
6.
121. State v. Addington, 557 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. 1977), prob. jurir. noted, 435 U.S. 967
(1978) (No. 77-5992). Even were the Court to approve the preponderance standard as a
minimum, the states will remain free, through legislation or judicial interpretation of their own
constitutions, to retain either of the higher standards as the appropriate one for long-term civil
commitment.
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commitments, a comparison of the relative interests of the state and
the individual in the short-term context helps to focus on the appro-
priate standard in certification proceedings.
1. The individuaIs interest in a high standard.
Part II of this note demonstrates that the individual interests at
stake in both long-term commitments and certifications are consider-
able. Either form of commitment will result in a loss of personal lib-
erty,12 2 stigma,23 unwanted medical treatment,24 and future legal
disabilities.125 Nevertheless, the difference in length of the imposed
hospitalization permits some distinction between the two forms of
commitment. Certification for 14 days is not likely to cause the psy-
chological phenomenon of "institutionalization, "126 a common result
of long-term confinement which is characterized by apathy and an
inability to function outside of the institutional environment. 27 Cer-
tifications also have a definite and easily foreseeable end; the individ-
ual has relative assurance of the right to a full trial before the state
may confine him for an additional period. 28 Furthermore, certifica-
tions are less likely to disrupt an individual's life, because unlike
long-term patients who are placed in state hospitals at a considerable
distance from family and friends, certified persons are usually hospi-
talized near their homes.' 29 Individuals do suffer significantly as a
122. See notes 59-63 supra and accompanying text.
123. See notes 64-68 supra and accompanying text.
124. See notes 69-72 supra and accompanying text.
125. The LPS Act does provide that persons may not be presumed incompetent for the
purpose of imposing legal disabilities on them simply because they have been certified, CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 5331 (West Supp. 1978), but a finding of mental illness or grave
disability would be relevant to determinations of competency. See In re Estate of Roulet, 20
Cal. 3d Adv. Sh. 653, 669, 574 P.2d 1245, 1254-55, 143 Cal. Rptr. 893, 902-03 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting), rehearing granted, 20 Cal. 3d 653 (1978).
126. Although the precise time necessary for a person to become "institutionalized" has
never been determined, short-term commitment for a maximum of 20 days is unlikely to
produce institutionalization. Institutionalization is not always inevitable and probably varies
in severity from individual to individual. For example, Kenneth Donaldson lived in a mental
hospital for 15 years and apparently escaped institutionalization during that time. But he is
exceptional and, even for him, adjustment to "living on the outside" again required effort.
See K. DONALDSON, supra note 60.
127. E. GOFFMAN, supra note 59, at 146-69; Chambers, supra note 59, at 1127-29.
128. The assurance of release or trial at the end of the 14-day certification is not com-
plete, however. The individual may be recertified for an additional 14 days or placed on a
temporary conservatorship, neither of which requires a full trial, although both these devices
provide for habeas corpus hearings, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5262 & 5263, 5350 &
5352.1 (West 1972 & Supp. 1978).
129. The LPS Act's 14-day certification procedure was designed in part to provide hos-
pitalization near the individual's residence, DILEMMA OF MENTAL COIrrMENTs, supra
note 19, at 90-92, so the individual would find it less difficult to return to his home. Id. at 64.
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result of certification, but probably escape the most drastic conse-
quences of long-term hospitalization.
2. The state's interest in a low standard.
The state's general interests in certification, protecting society1
30
and caring for incapacitated persons1 3 ' also apply to long-term com-
mitments, but certifications also serve a distinct purpose in the state's
general mental health system. The legislature intended certifications
to allow for crisis intervention and treatment of the mentally ill with-
out immediately subjecting them to long-term commitment.132 Doc-
tors were to have as much as 20 days in which to aid acute patients
with a minimum of legal interference. 133 The legislature believed,
and prevailing medical opinion indicated, that short-term state inter-
vention is helpful in alleviating acute mental distress, protecting
others from harm, and preventing suicides.134 These distinct pur-
poses may argue against the use of the same standard of proof in
certification hearings as in long-term commitment proceedings, be-
cause a high standard would increase judicial scrutiny and poten-
tially undermine the state's special interests in the certification
process.
C. Reconciling the Interests: Setting the Standard for Short- Term
Commitments
The comparison of the relative individual and state interests in
long-term and short-term commitments does not diminish the need
to protect the individual's interests in certification hearings, but it
does suggest that a somewhat lower standard of proof might be ap-
propriate in these proceedings. The inferences that might be drawn
initially from the comparison are that the standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, the higher of the two standards commonly re-
quired in long-term commitment proceedings, is inappropriate for
short-term commitment hearings, and that the lowest possible stan-
dard of probable cause is also improper because of the need to pro-
tect the important individual interests at stake. The choice of a
standard for certification hearings may lie somewhere between these
130. See notes 73-76 supra and accompanying text.
131. See notes 77-82 supra and accompanying text.
132. DILEMMA OF MENTAL COMMrrMENTS, supra note 19, at 137-38; ENKI RE-
SEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 13, at 15.
133. See notes 46-47 supra and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., A. STONE, supra note 70, at 64.
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two extremes with either the standard of preponderance of the evi-
dence or clear and convincing evidence. Keeping these initial infer-
ences in mind, this section canvasses all four possible standards of
proof in light of their practical consequences.
1. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt requires the
factfinder to be as certain as humanly possible that the party bearing
the burden of proof should prevail.' 3 5 The courts have been less than
unanimous in mandating the use of this strict standard of proof even
in long-term commitment proceedings, indicating that it may not be
the appropriate standard in certification hearings. The Supreme
Court's view that the length and severity of deprivations of liberty
are factors to be weighed in determining the nature of a hearing
1 36
combines with important practical factors and societal values to
weigh heavily against the use of the strict standard in certifications.
At some point, adding more procedural safeguards to a proceed-
ing makes it so cumbersome and renders so little additional benefit to
the individual that the balance tips against requiring the proposed
safeguard. 137 Requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in certifi-
cation hearings may raise just this problem. The state often has only
3 days to determine the need to certify an individual, and only 4 days
to evaluate the person before the certification hearing is held. This is
probably not enough time to gather sufficient evidence to overcome
reasonable doubts,13 and the cost of a full investigation of an indi-
135. See Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L.
REv. 1329, 1374 (1971). Simon and Mahan found one-third of the judges they surveyed
indicated proof beyond a reasonable doubt requires 100% certainty, one-third stated it re-
quires 90-95% certainty, and the remaining third stated the requisite certainty is 80% or
slightly less. Simon & Mahan, Quantifing the Burdens of Proof, 5 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 319, 324
(1971).
136. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975) (short suspension from school
milder than expulsion, but 10 days serious enough to warrant some procedural safeguards);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1972) (conditional liberty interest of parolees
requires due process safeguards but hearing can be informal). The cases incorporating the
safeguards of the Bill of Rights in the 14th amendment suggest that both the length of depri-
vation of liberty resulting from a proceeding and the history of a procedure help determine
the importance of a given safeguard. Compare Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)
(right to jury trial for crimes with sentences greater than 6 months; no common law tradition
ofjuries in petty cases), with Argerslinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (right to counsel in
all criminal cases, since no traditional exception for petty crimes). This approach would ar-
gue against the use of the same strict standard in short-term as in long-term commitments,
especially because there is no "traditional" standard in either form of commitment.
137. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. Rav. 1267, 1276 (1975).
138. A person may need several days to adjust to the hospital, see E. GOFFMAN, supra
note 59, at 148-49, before he can be realistically evaluated. The state would have to increase
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vidual prior to certification in order to sustain the heavy burden of
proof would be prohibitive in many instances.
Moreover, because a hearing must be held within 2 court days of
an individual's request, 39 counsel, doctors, and other witnesses have
only a short time in which to prepare.'O On such short notice, the
certifying psychiatrist may not be available to testify at all. Without
much time to prepare and potentially without the testimony of the
physician most familiar with the individual, the state may never be
able to meet the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.'
Finally, there must be a full trial on the issues if the state decides
to initiate long-term commitment at the end of the certification pe-
riod. 42 But if the state has recently demonstrated that a person is
mentally ill and dangerous, or gravely disabled beyond a reasonable
doubt, the results of a subsequent trial may be foreordained.' 43
Thus, the individual might actually suffer more in the long run if he
has been certified under the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.
The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard is inappropriate for
certification hearings. Given the slightly less serious impact of short-
the size of the professional staff of hospitals to provide for sufficient observation and testing
within a short period. Although this would be the best result in any case, state hospitals, at
least, are already badly understaffed. See McManus & Horowitz, Cruel and Usual Punishment,
NEw WEST, June 5, 1978, at 39.
139. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
140. In Santa Clara County, for example, certification hearings are held on Tuesdays
and Fridays. Both county counsel representing the state and public defenders representing
individuals have little time in which to prepare for the hearings, especially if an individual
requests a hearing on the same day as the hearings are scheduled. The public defender may
not be able to meet with her client until he arrives at the courthouse and has virtually no time
in which to investigate the situation fully. The same is true for the county counsel. Fre-
quently while the county counsel are off in one comer outside the courtroom hurriedly leafing
through hospital reports and talking to the doctors who will testify, the public defenders are
in another corner interviewing their clients.
141. The ENKI study found that judges almost always released individuals in the ab-
sence of medical testimony at the hearings, even with the present confusion over the burden
and standard of proof. ENKI RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supira note 13, at 181. The testimony of
a doctor is undoubtedly critical to the state's case, see Ennis & Litwack, supra note 68, at 694,
and if the certifying psychiatrist cannot testify, the state will have to substitute with a doctor
who usually bases her testimony on hospital records and a rushed interview with the peti-
tioner. A few hurried notes would not be sufficient to meet the reasonable-doubt standard.
142. CAL. WELF. & INST. CoDE §§ 5301 to 5303, 5350 (West 1972 & Supp. 1978). Trial
would immediately follow the'certification in the case of a post-certification for dangerousness
to others. A delay of at least 30 days before trial is possible in the case of 1-year conservator-
ships. Id. § 5352.1.
143. The fact and basis of the original certification might come into evidence at the
commitment trial either as the basis of opinion of the testifying psychiatrist or through the
state attorney's attempt to impeach the individual if he testifies at his trial. See CAL. EVID.
CODE §§ 773, 801 (West 1966).
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term commitments on individuals, it is impossible to justify requiring
a stricter standard of proof in certification hearings than is required
in long-term commitment trials in many instances.
2. Probable cause.
"Probable cause" means reasonable grounds to believe something
is true t4 and rests at the other extreme on the continuum of stand-
ards. This standard does not demand much certainty on the part of
the factfinder, and the risk of an erroneous determination against the
individual is so high that the standard's protection of the individual's
liberty interest is negligible. 145 Probable cause seems attractive be-
cause of the analogy between certification hearings and preliminary
hearings in criminal cases, in which the state must show probable
cause to detain a person suspected of committing a crime.'46 The
analogy quickly diminishes upon closer examination: In criminal
proceedings, a harm has already occurred, whereas in many certifica-
tion hearings actual harm to society is not an issue. 147 Moreover,
criminal defendants can gain release from custody on bail or their
own recognizance, while a certified person has no such opportunity
to leave the hospital.
41
Neither of the two extreme standards of proof is a workable solu-
tion to the problem of finding a standard of proof for certification
hearings. Two standards remain as candidates: preponderance of the
evidence and clear and convincing evidence.
144. A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF
CRIMINAL CASES § 241 (3d ed. 1977).
145. "Probable cause findings often tend toward 'rubber-stamp' determinations. Asser-
tions are often accepted at face value and inferences are generously drawn on the basis that
only reasonable grounds need support the truth of the alleged facts." MHLP Proposal, supra
note 5, at 100.
146. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); FED. R. CRIM. P. 5. The standard
has been applied to short-term commitment hearings by a few courts, In re Barnard, 455 F.2d
1370 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 1318(1976),
and at least one legislature, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.05.240 (1975).
147. See notes 85-89 supra and accompanying text.
148. A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, supra note 144, at §§ 54-59. In Califor-
nia, defendants may be admitted to bail as a matter of right in all but capital cases, CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1271 (West 1970), or released on their own recognizance, id. § 1318. Indigent
defendants may not be able to make bail and others may not be eligible for release on their
own recognizance, but these options remain available for many arrested people. Certified
persons, however, must remain in the hospital unless a doctor permits them to leave. Some-
times an attorney may be able to persuade the hospital staff to release an individual by
threatening to request a hearing. Interview with Steve Stevens, Santa Clara County Public
Defender's Office, in San Jose (July 18, 1977).
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3. Preponderance of the evidence.
This standard is the standard of proof used in most civil actions.
Preponderance of the evidence requires the factfinder to determine
that the existence of a fact is more probable than not before he may
find in favor of the party bearing the burden of proof.4 9 Logical
symmetry might argue for the preponderance standard in certifica-
tion hearings: The individual's interests at stake in certification pro-
ceedings are not as strong as those in long-term commitments, and a
lower standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt or clear and
convincing evidence might seem appropriate. 150 Such an analysis,
however, fails to account for either important values or practical re-
alities. While in a contract dispute, for example, "we view it as no
more serious . . for there to be an erroneous verdict in the defend-
ant's favor than for there to be an erroneous verdict in the plaintiff's
favor,"' 51 an erroneous verdict is a grave matter when an individual's
liberty and good name are at stake. The preponderance standard
simply does not provide adequate protection of those interests, be-
cause of its intrinsic mathematical indifference to the outcome.
In practical terms, the preponderance standard would actually
tip the balance slightly against the individual in certification hear-
ings. In a typical hearing, the state presents expert testimony that
the individual suffers from a mental disorder and is dangerous or
gravely disabled.152 Then the individual testifies to the effect that he
is none of these things. 153 Understandably, the judge in many in-
149. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 95, at § 339. When asked to state the degree of cer-
tainty necessary to find for the party bearing the burden under this preponderance standard,
over one-half of the judges in one study said the requisite probability was 55%. Simon &
Mahan, supra note 135, at 325.
150. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that deportation proceedings need only
be resolved by a preponderance of the evidence because they were civil in nature, stating, "To
be sure, a deportation proceeding is not a criminal prosecution . . . But it does not syllo-
gistically follow that a person may be banished from this country upon no higher degree of
proof than applies in a negligence case." Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385
U.S. 276, 285 (1966) (drastic nature of deportation and effect on liberty requires proof by
clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence).
151. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
152. In a typical hearing in Santa Clara County, the only evidence proffered by the
state is the testimony of a psychiatrist, who may or may not be the treating physician in the
case. The psychiatrist testifies that a person is mentally ill and often is allowed to offer a
conclusion that the person is dangerous or gravely disabled, although this question appears to
be at least in part a question of fact. Warren's study indicates that psychiatric evidence of
refusals to take medicine often resulted in a finding of grave disability. See Warren, supira note
13, at 634-65.
153. The individual, unlike many psychiatrists, may never have participated in a court
proceeding before. Any uncertainty or nervousness on the part of the individual is likely to be
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stances is likely to accord the psychiatrist's testimony slightly more
weight than the testimony of an individual who somehow wound up
in a mental hospital. Therefore, although the state would technically
bear the burden of proof, a mere preponderance standard would ef-
fectively shift the burden back to the individual, in contravention of
due process.'-'
Analysis of the available standards ultimately converges on the
flexible standard that lies in between proof beyond a reasonable
doubt and proof by preponderance: proof by clear and convincing
evidence.
4. Clear and convincing evidence.
The standard of proof by clear and convincing evidence lies
somewhere between the "slightly more probable" notion of the pre-
ponderance standard and the "as sure as humanly possible" concept
of beyond a reasonable doubt. One commentator has stated that the
standard of clear and convincing evidence requires a finding that the
existence of a fact is "highly probable.' 5 5 The standard is especially
responsive to the policies at issue in a given proceeding, allowing for
adjustment to the specific consequences of the proceeding. 156
The Supreme Court has recognized that due process can require
the use of the clear and convincing standard in proceedings that have
a substantial effect on personal liberty. In Woodby v. Immigration &
perceived by the judge as evidence of mental illness in light of what the psychiatrist has
already said. Often, no matter what evidence is presented, the judge will simply refuse to
believe the individual. Hearing of July 19, 1977, supra note 37.
154. See Part II supra.
155. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 95, at § 340. In holding that the standard of clear and
convincing evidence is required in long-term civil commitment proceedings, the New Mexico
Supreme Court noted, "For evidence to be clear and convincing, it must instantly tilt the
scales in the affirmative when weighed against the evidence in opposition and the fact finder's
mind is left with an abiding conviction that the evidence is true." In re Valdez, 88 N.M. 338,
343, 540 P.2d 818, 823 (1975) (quoting In re Sedillo, 84 N.M. 10, 12, 498 P.2d 1353,1355
(1972)).
156. See Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10, 25 (D. Iowa 1975) (court must look
to nature of right involved to determine proper standard of proof). The California courts
have followed Alsager, a juvenile case, in a series of decisions involving the standard of proof
for finding a child to be a dependent ward of the court. Despite clear statutory language
establishing preponderance of the evidence as the standard in findings of dependency, CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 355 (West Supp. 1978), the courts have used their discretion to adjust
the standard of proof to the severity of the disposition likely to follow from a dependency
finding. Compare In re Robert P., 61 Cal. App. 3d 310, 318, 132 Cal. Rptr. 5, 10 (1st Dist.
1976) (clear and convincing evidence where finding will deprive parent of custody), with In re
Christopher B., 82 Cal. App. 3d 608, 617-18, 147 Cal. Rptr. 390, 395 (3d Dist. 1978) (prepon-
derance where finding will only result in supervision of parent).
February 1979] SHORT-TERM CIVIL COMMITMENT
Naturalization Service, 157 the Court acknowledged that a deportation
proceeding is different from a criminal prosecution, but recognized
the "drastic deprivations" of liberty resulting from deportation. The
Court found the standard of clear and convincing evidence particu-
larly useful in its protection of individual interests and its flexible
response to the circumstances of a given case.1
5 8
The intermediate standard of clear and convincing evidence en-
sures judicial protection of the individual's interests while recogniz-
ing the reasonable limits of time and resources faced by the state in
certification hearings.
D. The Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard in Practice
The burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that an
individual is gravely disabled or dangerous as a result of a mental
disorder is not unduly onerous for the state. The 72 hours (or more)
during which the person is in the hospital before certification gives
the staff adequate time to determine that it is "highly probable" that
the person is suffering from a mental disorder, the threshold question
in a certification hearing.
59
The other substantive grounds for certification do not present in-
ordinate problems of proof under the clear and convincing standard.
In showing "grave disability," testimony on the certified individual's
ability to provide food, clothing, or shelter should be readily avail-
able if the person is truly within the statutory provision: The stan-
dard simply requires that the judge be satisfied that the individual is
unable to provide for himself. A psychiatrist's general assertion that
a person has "poor judgment" in his eating habits, while likely to
persuade a judge to uphold the certification under the preponder-
157. 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
158. "This Court has not closed its eyes to the drastic deprivations that may follow
when a resident of this country is compelled by our Government to forsake all the bonds
formed here and go to a foreign land where he often has no contemporary identification. In
words apposite to the question before us, we have spoken of 'the solidity of proof that is
required for ajudgrnent entailing the consequences of deportation, particularly in the case of
an old man who has lived in this country for forty years .. ' " Id. at 285 (quoting Rowoldt
v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115, 120 (1957)); see Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960) (clear
and convincing evidence standard required to revoke naturalization); Nishikawa v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 129 (1958) (same in expatriation proceeding).
159. Although diagnostic accuracy is questionable even under ideal conditions, an indi-
vidual's behavior over a few days should indicate whether he suffers from a mental disorder or
not. See, e.g., Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Ana'.sis of Mental Healh Law, 51 S.
CAL_ L. REv. 527 (1978). The clear and convincing standard simply suggests to psychiatrists
that they must be more certain of their evaluations than they need be at present and that they
have an objective basis for their evaluations.
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ance standard, would not be sufficient to constitute the high
probability that the person cannot provide for food required under
the clear and convincing standard. 6 ° But, evidence that a person
has not eaten for days before hospitalization, or is suffering from mal-
nutrition, can be obtained and probably would meet the clear and
convincing test. 161
"Dangerousness to self or others" is difficult to prove under any
standard. The difficulty of predicting violent or suicidal behavior
under even the best diagnostic conditions 6 2 makes it almost as diffi-
cult for the state to meet the preponderance standard, if fairly ap-
plied by the judge, as it would be to meet the clear and convincing
standard.'63 On the other hand, if the state does have reliable evi-
dence of the person's assaultive behavior or of a genuine suicide at-
tempt, the clear and convincing evidence standard should not be a
serious obstacle to certification.
I64
160. "Poor judgment" is frequently invoked by psychiatrists testifying in Santa Clara
County certification hearings. It is difficult to know precisely what the term means, because it
is used to refer to absence of judgment, judgment differing from that of the psychiatrist, or
simply a few erroneous decisions. The phrase has a normative quality that may often reflect
an educational or class bias. See BRAGINSKY & BRAGINSKY, MAINSTREAM PSYCHOLOGY: A
CRITIQUE (1974); P. CHESLER, WOMEN AND MADNESS (1972); B. DOHRENWEND & B.
DOHRENWEND, SOCIAL STATUS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDER: A CAUSAL INQUIRY
(1969); A. HOLLINGSHEAD & F. REDLICH, SOCIAL CLASS AND MENTAL ILLNESS (1958). For
example, a diet consisting largely of rice, tortillas, and beans might be regarded as insuffi-
ciently nutritious by a psychiatrist because it lacks green vegetables and fruits; a person whose
diet consisted of these foods might be said to have "poor judgment" about food. If the person
were a poor Mexican-American, however, his judgment about nutrition would be perfectly
normal and "sane." The clear and convincing standard would caution a judge to take such
things into account in making his decision. At least such a test would limit the discretion that
currently permits judges to find individuals gravely disabled on the grounds, for example,
that a person's home was dirty. See Warren, supra note 13, at 638.
161. This is essentially a factual question and can be addressed by witnesses who are not
psychiatric experts. See Morse, supra note 159, at 616.
162. See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
163. See Monahan & Wexler, A Drfiite Maybe: Proof and Probability in Civil Commitment, 2
LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 37 (1978). Several courts have asserted that the difficulty of prov-
ing dangerousness argues for a lower standard of proof than beyond a reasonable doubt. See,
e.g., In re Stephenson, 67 Ill. 2d 544, 555-56, 367 N.E.2d 1273, 1277 (1977). This is as absurd
as urging that the standard of proof in criminal trials should be lower because the difficulty of
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt leaves many guilty people unpunished.
164. Thejudge will likely be cautious about releasing persons labeled as dangerous even
under the clear and convincing standard, given the numerous "horror stories" about persons
who committed suicide or killed another person upon release from the hospital. See Treffert,
The Practical Limits of Patient's Rights, 15 PSYCH. ANNALS 91 (April 1975); cf. Tarasoff v. Re-
gents of the Univ. of.Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425,551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (psychiatrist
liable for negligent failure to warn victim of patient's threats). In particular, a judge could
find clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness if the individual has acted violently dur-
ing the hospitalization period, although prior acts or threats alone are not necessarily good
predictors of dangerousness. See Deovelopments--Civil Commitment, supra note 2, at 1301-02;
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The clear and convincing standard will have its most important
effect onjudges. At present,judges have broad discretion in deciding
whether to grant petitions for release from certification. The inter-
mediate standard will oblige them to consider the evidence more
critically, thereby avoiding the presumption that the petitioner is
mentally ill and that the petitioner's interests in avoiding confine-
ment should therefore be discounted. Specifically, when applied to
the elements of grave disability or dangerousness, the clear and con-
vincing standard will help prevent commitment on the constitution-
ally impermissible ground of mental illness alone.
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts and legislatures must look critically at the substantive
standards for civil commitment, to ensure that people are not invol-
untarily hospitalized merely because society does not want them.
Nevertheless, "[t]he history of liberty has largely been the history of
procedural safeguards."' 65 Procedural safeguards can help to pre-
vent erroneous commitment, and the consequent deprivation of lib-
erty, good name, and even mental health, that commitment entails.
By examining the process of short-term commitment through the ex-
ample of the LPS Act's 14-day certification process, this note has ar-
gued that requiring the state to justify short-term commitment by
bearing the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence is a
vital addition to procedural due process. Though the courts could
theoretically enforce such a requirement by constitutional holdings,
the rational path is for legislatures to assign the burden and establish
the standard of proof in unmistakable statutory language.
Lynne V Henderson
Comment, Overt Dangerous Behavior as a Constitutional Requirement for Involuntag Civil Commitment
of the Mentally Ill, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 562, 583-85 (1977).
On the other hand, caution about releasing individuals has led to equally tragic results.
One commentator relates the story of a Polish immigrant who had been in a Nazi concentra-
tion camp and who was committed because he could not speak English. Unable to obtain
release from the hospital because of his inability to communicate, the man committed suicide,
apparently out of fear and despair. See Kutner, The Illusion of Due Process in Commitment
Proceedings, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 383, 383-84 (1962).
165. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.).

